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Abstract 
 
This essay-review (of The Market and Other Orders, volume 15 of the Collected Works of F. A. 
Hayek) uses the essays collected in the volume as a vehicle to discuss certain key issues raised 
by Hayek’s work, including: that the knowledge required for plan coordination is provided not 
only by prices but also by formal and informal social rules; that the capacity of the price 
mechanism to coordinate people’s plans is best viewed as an emergent property of the market 
system; that this emergent coordinative power also forms the basis for the process of group-
selection the basis of Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution; that the nature of the interaction 
between the overall order of actions and the casual powers of other emergent entities is shaped 
by social structures; that Hayek’s notion of ‘order’ is different from the economist’s notion of 
‘general equilibrium’; and that Hayek’s ideas anticipate those of modern complexity theory. 
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Orders, Orders, Everywhere … On Hayek’s The Market and other Orders. 
 
1. Introduction 
Friedrich Hayek was a scholar of uncommon breadth and depth whose work will be a source of 
insight for many years to come. Over his long career his interests spanned a wide range of 
subjects including psychology, economics, political philosophy, the philosophy of (social) 
science, and intellectual history. It is perhaps, therefore, something of a surprise to find an 
extraordinary consistency and unity in his thought running through time and subject matter. In 
volume 15 of the Collected Works of F. A. Hayek (Hayek 2014), entitled ‘The Market and other 
Orders’, editor Bruce Caldwell has selected papers, ranging in date of publication from Hayek’s 
pivotal 1937 paper on ‘Economics and Knowledge’ ([1937] 2014) to his 1975 Nobel Memorial 
prize lecture on ‘The Pretence of Knowledge’ ([1975] 2014), that illustrate this unity in a very 
instructive way. Throughout his professional career Hayek wrestled with issues related to the 
coordination of interrelated human actions, positing from early on that there was some kind of 
‘ordering’ or ‘coordinating’ set of properties to the market process. This theme of ‘spontaneous 
order’ is the connecting thread that runs through all of his work, not just in economics but also in 
theoretical psychology and political philosophy. And in this volume we can trace the 
development of Hayek’s ideas on this topic through his career, relating it in particular to his 
emerging view of the economy as a complex system.  
We begin in the next section with a discussion of Hayek’s crucial ‘early years’ (the 1930s 
and 1940s at the London School of Economics). The articles published in this period—still 
frequently cited today—contain penetrating analyses of the nature of equilibrium, knowledge and 
the market process. In writing these early papers, Hayek was coming to grips with the themes 
that were to define the rest of his long career. In section 3 we discuss Hayek’s treatment of 
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complexity in the social world. We bring out in particular the fact, often unappreciated, that on 
Hayek’s account the coordinative power of the market is an emergent property of the free market 
system that is formed when people’s interactions are structured by certain kinds of formal and 
informal rules. We also highlight the point, also insufficiently widely acknowledged, that Hayek 
provides a satisfactory explanation of how order is possible in decentralised market economies 
only in his later work, which is ostensibly on political philosophy rather than economics. In 
section 4 we discuss Hayek’s vision of the world as consisting of many different, hierarchically-
organised complex orders, of which the market is only one. Far from being an ontological 
reductionist, as he is sometimes (mis-)portrayed, Hayek subscribes to a view of the world as 
consisting of a series of ontologically distinct, and irreducible, layers of phenomena. We explore 
this further in section 5, examining the implications of Hayek’s views for the possibility of multi-
level interaction, arguing−contrary to some readings of Hayek−that Hayek’s approach admits the 
possibility the emergent properties possessed by social systems include the capacity to shape, via 
downward causation, human agency. In section 6 we turn to the question of how different 
societies come to be characterized by different sets of orders and thus different levels of 
economic success. Hayek posited a group selection evolutionary process that has been the 
subject of some criticism. We examine this and find Hayek’s story to be more plausible than the 
critics have suggested. In sections 7 and 8 we examine Hayek’s perception of the market as a 
dynamic process occurring in real time. We focus on two questions in particular: how do real-
world economic actors cope with radical uncertainty; and what is the nature of any tendency 
toward plan coordination? We argue in particular that Hayek’s analysis implies that, even in the 
absence of external shocks,  the question of whether the market system tends to produce greater 
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plan coordination cannot be answered on the basis of a priori argument alone. Section 9 
concludes with an examination of Hayek’s ideas in relation to modern complexity theory.  
 
2. Equilibrium, Prices, Rules and Social Order 
It was in a lecture delivered in 1936 to the London Economics Club that Hayek first grappled 
with some of the enduring themes that were to shape the remainder of his career. This paper is 
clearly a major departure for him: 
 
It was really the beginning of my looking at things in a new light. If you asked me, I 
would say that up until that moment I was developing conventional ideas. With the ’37 
lecture … I started my own way of thinking. (Hayek 1983, quoted by Caldwell 2014: 3) 
 
In this lecture Hayek explored for the first time the concept of equilibrium from a subjectivist 
perspective, a route which took him immediately to questions about action, time, knowledge and 
expectations. Hayek realized that, unlike its counterpart in the physical world, the notion of 
equilibrium in economics must refer to the views of individuals as they act in the social world. 
Hence Hayek defined equilibrium as a situation in which ‘the different plans which the 
individuals composing [a society] have made for action in time are mutually compatible’ (Hayek 
[1937] 2014: 64). Equilibrium is here conceived as a situation in which individual knowledge 
and expectations, and the actions based on them, are compatible with the 'data,' where the 'data' 
for one individual include the plans and actions of other individuals. Hayek wonders how 
people’s plans are in fact synchronized and coordinated. All successful human action is based on 
perceived and reliable causal connections between those actions and their effects. Disparate 
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expectations, implying the inevitability of widespread errors and plan failures, would appear to 
preclude successful action. Having been pushed by the logic of equilibrium in a changing world 
to consider this question, it became a preoccupation of Hayek's throughout his career, even as he 
moved beyond economics narrowly understood. But it was also the beginning of his penetrating 
critique of some aspects of accepted theory and practice, most notably the meaning of 
competition and the market process, that are the themes of the other three articles that comprise 
Part 1 of the volume under review, entitled The Early Years. In retrospect, these papers can be 
seen to have laid the basis for his later work on the nature of the rules and practices that facilitate 
successful human action in dynamically changing societies, societies that are essentially complex 
phenomena. 
In what is his most cited article, Hayek ([1945] 2014) posits that the high degree of 
coordination observed in economic life reflects the pivotal role of prices as both signals and 
incentives. Price movements signal changes to which individuals are motivated to adapt even in 
the absence of any knowledge as to their causes. His example of a sudden scarcity in the supply 
of tin, which results in a rise in its price that provokes individuals to economize on it, and to seek 
to produce substitutes, is justly famous as a canonical statement on the role of prices as 
‘knowledge surrogates’ that communicate much of the information people need to coordinate 
their plans. As Hayek noted in ‘Economics and Knowledge’, in an economy characterised by an 
elaborate division of labour, knowledge—about people’s tastes, about the availability of 
resources, about the technology that might be employed to produce goods—is inevitably 
dispersed throughout the population ([1937] 2014: 72). However, as he went on to argue in ‘The 
Use of Knowledge in Society’, when one set of individuals implements plans formulated on the 
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basis of their local (dispersed and also often tacit) knowledge
1
, their actions generate changes in 
relative prices which summarise in a publicly available form the significance of that knowledge 
for the scarcity of various kinds of resource.
2
 And those price changes both enable and encourage 
other people to adjust their own plans so as to dovetail with those of the first group, without the 
former in fact knowing anything about the details of the local knowledge that informed the 
latter’s actions ([1945] 2014: 99-100).3  
This is the second of the two famous ‘knowledge’ articles—published eight years apart 
(1937 and 1945)—that set the tone for so much that was to follow. Interestingly, there is 
potentially a tension between them. In ‘Economics and Knowledge’ Hayek emphasizes the 
subjective nature of knowledge and expectations ([1937] 2014: 60). The ‘data’ upon which we 
base our actions are to a large extent composed of our expectations of the actions of others upon 
whom we depend in order to bring our plans to fruition. More generally, as Hayek shows 
beautifully in an article written just a few years later, the very ‘facts’ of any given social situation 
are themselves really the interpretations we make of events and things in order to classify them 
by analogy to what we already know into categories useful for action and understanding (Hayek 
[1943] 2014). Thus, any social event, including a price change, must be interpreted if it is to be 
of any use. Yet, in ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ Hayek seems to come close to attributing 
                                                     
1
 By ‘dispersed knowledge’ Hayek ([1945] 2014: 95) means, in his famous phrase, ‘the particular circumstances of time and place. This 
encompasses knowledge of ‘local conditions and of special circumstances’ rather than of ‘general rules’. Examples include knowledge of ‘a 
machine not fully employed, or [of] somebody’s skills which could be better utilised, or ... of a surplus stock [of some good].’ As these examples 
attest, local knowledge is often explicit, propositional knowledge (that is, knowledge that such-and-such is the case). In the case of ‘tacit 
knowledge’, however, people have the capacity to act according to (general) rules without necessarily being able to state those rules explicitly 
(Hayek [1962] 233; [1969] 2014: 317-18). An example of such ‘know-how’ is provided by the people’s ability to speak and write grammatically 
correct English without being able to articulate the rules of English grammar. Herein then lies the distinction between these two kinds of 
knowledge: dispersed knowledge is explicit and has as its object particular facts; tacit knowledge is not propositional and has as its object general 
rules. Of course, notwithstanding the possibility of drawing such analytical distinctions, Hayek also notes that in practice two forms of knowledge 
may come into contact with each other. For example, in ‘Competition as a Discovery Procedure’, Hayek argues that one example of tacit 
knowledge is provided by an entrepreneur’s ‘capacity to find out particular circumstances’. That is to say, according to Hayek, while 
entrepreneurs possess the capacity to discover local, propositional knowledge, they may be unable to ‘list and the principles that underlie their 
ability to do so ([1968] 2014: 306). 
2
 As Caldwell rightly notes in his editor’s Introduction, Hayek’s emphasis is on the role of disequilibrium, as distinct from equilibrium, prices 
(2014: 9-11; also see Thomsen 1992 and Kirzner 1997). 
3
 In a series of lectures delivered at the University of Virginia in 1961, entitled ‘A New Look at Economic Theory’ and published for the first 
time as Appendix A of this volume, Hayek offers a similar account of ‘The Communication Function of the Market’, couched not in terms of tin 
but of sisal and jute (Hayek [1961] 2014: 415-22). 
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an ‘objective’ status to price changes in the sense that, at times, he seems almost to suggest that 
they provide unambiguous signals to people about what needs to be done.  
One way of resolving this tension is to interpret the later article as taking the success of 
the market process as a given, as confirmed by our shared experience, and proceeding then to 
describe the implications of this success, and the pitfalls of failing to understand it. This leaves 
aside the question of how, and under what circumstances, people are able to extract from price 
signals knowledge that is accurate enough to permit the system to function as we know it can and 
does. But for sure this is not a question that Hayek ignored in any way. Hayek hints at an answer 
in ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society,’ when he refers to the way in which people ‘make 
constant use of formulas, symbols and rules whose meaning we do not understand and through 
the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not 
possess’ ([1945] 2014: 101). But a fuller answer came only later, in Hayek’s later writings on 
political philosophy and the law, where he argued systematically and explicitly that the 
dissemination of knowledge required for plan coordination is facilitated not only by price signals 
but also by a set of intersubjectively shared rules and norms, including both formal legal rules 
and also informal norms of honesty and promise-keeping. The fact that people act in accordance 
with the same general guidelines about how to interpret and act in various kinds of situation 
makes it possible for them to form reasonably accurate expectations of each other’s future 
conduct, thereby enabling them to formulate plans that have a reasonable chance of coming to 
fruition (Fleetwood 1995; Lewin 1997; Vaughn 1999a). As Hayek puts it: 
 
What makes men members of the same civilization and enables them to live and 
work together in peace is that in the pursuit of their individual ends the particular 
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monetary impulses which impel their efforts towards concrete results are guided 
and restrained by the same abstract rules. If emotion or impulse tells them what 
they want, the conventional rules tell them how they will be able and be allowed 
to achieve it. (Hayek 1976: 12) 
 
Perhaps most notably, by facilitating enforceable contracts, the set of rules in question enables 
people to formulate and embark upon plans of action in the confident expectation that the 
contributions from their fellow men required to implement those plans will actually be 
forthcoming.
4
 In the present volume, one can see early formulations of this idea in Hayek’s Cairo 
Lectures on ‘The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law’, where Hayek refers to how ‘if a multitude 
of individual elements obey certain general laws, this may … produce a definite order of the 
whole mass without the interference of an outside force’ (Hayek [1955a] 2014: 160). This 
possibility ‘applies to the laws obeyed by men no less than to the laws of nature’. It is, Hayek 
tells us, is an example of ‘what Michael Polanyi has described as the spontaneous formation of a 
polycentric order; an order which is not the result of all factors being taken into account by a 
single centre, but which is produced by the responses of the individual elements to their 
respective surroundings’ ([1955a] 2014: 160-61).5  
The outcome that is generated when people’s (inter)actions are structured by an 
appropriate set of rules is orderly in the following sense: 
 
                                                     
4
 As Hayek puts it elsewhere, the information provided by market prices enables people to form reasonably accurate expectations of one 
another’s plans only if it arises against ‘a fairly constant framework of known facts’, as provided by social rules and norms (Hayek 1976: 125). 
Thus, stability and predictability in one sphere, namely that of institutions, is a necessary ingredient for coping with its absence (unpredictable 
novelty) in another sphere (Lewin 2014: 187-88). 
5
 In addition to being the first place where Hayek used the term ‘spontaneous order’, the Cairo lectures also saw him elaborate on several issues 
in political theory, the history of political thought, and jurisprudence—such as the notions of ‘equality before the law’ and the ‘rule of law’, and 
the history of liberalism—that would form part of the core of The Constitution of Liberty (Hayek 1960) (Caldwell 2014: 12-14). 
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By ‘order’ we shall … describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements 
of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance 
with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations 
concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving 
correct. (Hayek 1973: 36; emphasis removed) 
 
And the orderliness of free market activity manifests itself in the fact that people can usually 
predict their behaviour of their fellows well enough to implement successfully the plans they 
make in the course of going about their daily lives and meeting their most basic needs (Hayek 
1973: 36). As we shall see in section 7 below, this notion of ‘order’ differs in significant ways 
from the standard notion of general equilibrium. 
What all this suggests, as Caldwell (2014: 12-14) notes in his Introduction, is that 
Hayek’s post-1937 research in economics and his later investigations in social theory and 
political philosophy form a more coherent body of work than might at first glance appear to be 
the case.
6
 That is so not simply because, as is widely recognised, Hayek’s insight that the 
problem of order is primarily an epistemic one informed his writings on political philosophy and 
social theory. The coherence also reflects the fact, less commonly acknowledged, that it was only 
in this later work, ostensibly on political philosophy, that Hayek was finally able to provide a 
                                                     
6
 The reason why the claim about coherence concerns Hayek’s post-1937 work in economics is that, as Hayek notes in the long passage from 
‘Kinds of Rationalism’ quoted in the main text, and as Caldwell (2014:3-5) explains in his editor’s Introduction, Hayek’s 1937 paper on 
‘Economics and Knowledge’ marks a major shift in his approach to economic analysis. Prior to that paper, Hayek was an exponent of the 
standard approach to economics, namely equilibrium analysis. Indeed, before 1937, Hayek virtually defined economics as equilibrium analysis, 
maintaining that any legitimate economic explanation must employ some notion of equilibrium. However, due principally to the experience of 
participating in the socialist calculation debate of the 1930s, Hayek came to question both the merits of the equilibrium concept. The use of 
general equilibrium theory to justify market socialism led Hayek to revise his understanding of his own approach to economics and to begin to 
distance himself from that mode of analysis. For in responding to the arguments of the market socialists—arguments that were couched in terms 
of the equilibrium framework by which he himself had set such store in the past—Hayek came to realise that his emergent understanding of the 
market as a dynamic process of adjustment was one to which equilibrium analysis could not do justice. The reason, of course, is that by confining 
itself to situations in which people’s plans are already coordinated, equilibrium analysis ignores the most important question that must be 
answered both in explaining how market economies work, and also in evaluating the feasibility of central planning, namely that of how (if at all) 
people acquire the information they need to coordinate their plans and thereby achieve an orderly allocation of resources (Kirzner ([1988] 1992; 
Caldwell 2004: 155-62, 209-220, 409-22). 
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convincing answer to the question, first posed in his narrow technical work on economics, of 
how socio-economic order is possible in decentralised market economies. As Hayek himself put 
it, in retrospective reflections on the development of his research penned in his essay on ‘Kinds 
of Rationalism’: 
 
[T]hough at one time a very pure and narrow economic theorist, I was led from 
technical economics into all kinds of questions usually regarded as philosophical. 
When I look back, it seems all to have begun, nearly thirty years ago, with an 
essay on ‘Economics and Knowledge’ in which I examined what seemed to me 
some of the central difficulties of pure economic theory. Its main conclusion was 
that the task of economic theory was to explain how an overall order of economic 
activity was achieved which utilized a large amount of knowledge which was not 
concentrated in any one mind but existed only as the separate knowledge of 
thousands or millions of different individuals. But it was still a long way from this 
to an adequate insight into the relations between the abstract rules which the 
individual follows in his actions, and the abstract overall order which is formed as 
a result of his responding, within the limits imposed upon him by those abstract 
rules, to the concrete particular circumstances which he encounters. It was only 
through a re-examination of the age-old concept of freedom under the law, the 
basic conception of traditional liberalism, and of the problems of the philosophy 
of the law which this raises, that I have reached what now seems to me a tolerably 
clear picture of the nature of the spontaneous order of which liberal economists 
have so long been talking. (Hayek [1965] 2014: 49-50). 
11 
 
 
In emphasising the importance of rules as well as prices, Hayek can in his later work be thought 
of as attempting to devise an interdisciplinary, social-theoretic—as opposed to narrowly 
economic—approach to the explanation of plan coordination (Fleetwood 1995; Vaughn 1999). 
We can elaborate on the nature of this account by exploring another development in Hayek’s 
post-war thinking apparent in the essays collected in this volume, namely his increasing 
emphasis on viewing society as a complex system.  
 
3. Complexity and the Coordinating Power of the Market as an Emergent Property  
Responding to criticisms of his efforts in The Counter-Revolution of Science (Hayek [1952] 
2010] to draw a sharp distinction between the methods of the natural and the social sciences 
made, amongst others, by the philosopher Ernst Nagel and the mathematician Warren Weaver, 
Hayek began from the mid-1950s to distinguish between those sciences that study relatively 
simple phenomena and those whose subject matter is relatively complex (Hayek [1955b] 2014) 
(Caldwell 2014: 14-15). For Hayek, a complex system consists of a set of parts or elements 
which are related to each another, and so interact with one another, in a particular way.  The set 
of relations that must obtain between a set of elements if they are to constitute a particular kind 
of complex system is the system’s structure. As Hayek writes in a unpublished paper that 
complements those reprinted in this collection, ‘The term system will … be used here in the 
sense in which it is used in von Bertalanffy’s “General System Theory”,’ that is ‘in the sense of a 
coherent structure of causally connected physical parts’ (Hayek n.d.: 4). 
While not completely pellucid (Fiori 2009, Rosser 2010), Hayek’s explicit account of 
complexity appears to suggest that it has two defining features. The first is that complexity 
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involves ‘structures whose characteristic properties can be exhibited only by models made up of 
relatively large numbers of variables’ ([1975] 2014: 365; also see [1955] 2014: 195-96, 200 and 
[1964] 2014: 260-61). The second is that complex systems display what are known as emergent 
properties. The term ‘emergence refers to situations where, when certain elements stand in 
particular relations to one another, the system that is formed has properties that are not possessed 
by its constituent parts taken in isolation or as an unstructured aggregate. As Hayek puts it in his 
essay on ‘The Theory of Complex Phenomena’, the hallmark of emergence is that ‘a certain 
combination of ... structures produces an overall structure possessing distinct characteristic 
properties’: 
 
The “emergence” of “new” patterns as a result of the increase in the number of 
elements between which simple relations exist, means that this larger structure will 
possess certain general or abstract features which will recur independently of the 
particular values of the individual data, so long as the general structure (as described, 
e.g., by an algebraic equation) is preserved. Such “wholes”, defined in terms of 
certain general properties of their structure, will constitute distinctive objects of 
explanation for a theory, even though such a theory may be merely a particular way 
of fitting together statements about the relations between individual elements. 
(Hayek [1964] 2014: 261-62) 
 
Emergent properties are structural or relational in the sense that their existence depends not only 
on the presence of their (‘lower-level’) constituent parts but also on those parts being organised 
into a particular (‘higher-level’) structure that involves them standing in specific relations to one 
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another. More specifically, emergent properties arise in systems that are characterised by what 
Hayek terms organised complexity:  
 
Organised complexity here means that the character of the structures showing it 
depends not only on the properties of the individual elements of which they are 
composed, and the relative frequency with which they occur but also on the manner 
in which the individual elements are connected with each other. (Hayek [1975] 2014: 
365) 
 
Emergent properties are ontologically and causally irreducible to the properties of the lower-
level elements of which the emergent or higher-level whole is formed. Where emergent 
properties arise, therefore, there is not merely a quantitative but a qualitative difference made to 
the world. New categories, irreducible to those required to understand the lower-level elements, 
are needed in order to conceptualise adequately the nature and causal impact of the emergent 
whole (Lewin 2014: 179-82; Lewis 2012, 2015a; Turner 2014).  
 For Hayek, one notable example of a complex system is, of course, the market economy. 
In particular, as Hayek comes to see it, the ability of the price mechanism to coordinate people’s 
plans is an emergent property of the complex (market) system that is formed when people’s 
(inter)actions are governed both by the formal rules of contract, property and tort law, and also 
by informal moral norms of honesty and promise-keeping. In his essay on Notes on the Evolution 
of Systems of Rules of Conduct, Hayek christens the coordinative power in question, ‘the overall 
order of actions’ (Hayek [1967] 2014: 282). It is an emergent property because it is possessed 
only by a particular whole, namely the free market system that is constituted by a group of 
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people whose interactions are structured by a set of rules like that mentioned above. In Hayek’s 
words, it is ‘more than the totality of regularities observable in the actions of the individuals and 
cannot be reduced to them ... It is more than the mere sum of its parts but presupposes also that 
those elements are related to each other in a particular manner’ (Hayek [1967a] 2014: 282).7  
The epistemological implication of complexity are that the outcomes that result from the 
operation of complex systems do not lend themselves to precise quantitative predictions. Instead, 
they are intelligible in that we are able to understand the kinds of outcomes—defined in terms of 
their general attributes rather than in terms of the properties of any individual component—that 
are possible. Thus patterns rather than point values are what can be predicted. Of course, the 
inability to make specific predictions makes it harder to falsify theories (Hayek [1955] 2014: 
207, 210, [1964] 2014: 264). However, as Hayek is anxious to point out, this does not preclude 
altogether the possibility of an important type of (Popperian) falsification or refutation. Certain 
resulting patterns are ruled out by this type of investigation; the observation of a pattern of 
results outside the range predicted by a model of some complex phenomenon would refute that 
model. For example, confirmed observations of inherited traits acquired in a Lamarckian manner 
would refute the Darwinian version of evolution (Hayek [1964] 2014: 259-60, 263-71; [1975] 
2014: 365-71). Moreover, as we shall see in Section 7 below, pattern prediction is not the sole 
preserve of (social) scientists; it is also something that businessmen must rely on in attempting to 
navigate their way through a complex economic system. 
 
 
                                                     
7
 Hayek make a similar point in The Errors of Constructivism, writing that, ‘The order of society is therefore a factual state of affairs which must 
be distinguished from the regularity of the conduct of individuals’ ([1970] 2014: 344). 
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4. Hayek, other ‘Orders’ and the Stratified Nature of Reality 
As Caldwell (2014: 24-25) notes in his excellent ‘Introduction’ to the volume, Hayek contends 
that the notion of ‘order’—understood as referring to a situation in which the actions of various 
members of a group are coordinated or brought into mutual adjustment, so that they stand in 
certain relations to one another—is applicable not only to the market economy but also to other 
natural and social phenomena. While it is possible for some simple kinds of order to be created 
through the deliberate arrangement of the relevant parts, Hayek’s main focus is of course on 
those complex orders which—like the market order or catallaxy—arise spontaneously (that is, as 
the unintended consequence of the rule-guided behaviour of their individual parts, without any 
conscious direction) (Hayek [1967b] 2014). Prominent amongst such orders is the human mind, 
and it will be helpful for drawing out some important aspects of Hayek’s thought to explore in 
more detail his account of the mind as a spontaneous, rule-governed order. 
 Hayek’s theoretical psychology is set out in full in his 1952 book The Sensory Order 
(Hayek 1952). The volume under review here contains two essays in particular that draw on and 
develop some of the ideas advanced in that work, namely ‘Rules, Perception and Intelligibility’ 
and ‘The Primacy of the Abstract’. Hayek views the mind as consisting of a structured hierarchy 
of interconnected nerve fibres, which acts as a rule-governed system of classification that 
discriminates between different physical stimuli in such a way as to give rise to the pattern of 
sensations—the sensory order, in Hayek’s terminology—that people actually experience. ‘What 
we call ‘mind’,’ Hayek (1952: 16) writes, ‘is thus a particular order of a set of events taking 
place in some organism and in some manner related to but not identical with the physical order 
of events in the environment’. The neuronal structures in question are—as we shall elaborate in 
the next section of this paper—the material embodiment of a set of abstract social rules that not 
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only govern perception but also regulate all of the other activities of our minds and indeed much 
of human action. As Hayek puts it, ‘We ought to regard what we call mind as a system of 
abstract rules’ ([1969] 2014: 43). These rule-governed neural structures create in people 
dispositions both to perceive certain classes of external stimuli as constituting particular types of 
situation, and also ultimately to respond to those circumstances in certain ways. On Hayek’s 
account, therefore, there is no orchestrating Cartesian ‘self’ that oversees and directs the function 
of the neurons in the brain. Rather, our mental life is a spontaneous order, the unintended 
(emergent) outcome of the rule-governed interactions of a myriad of neurons (Hayek [1962] 
2014: 232-36; [1969] 2014: 317-21, 326-27) (also see Dempsey 1996: 25-27, 33).  
As Hayek’s use of the term ‘order’ suggests, he views the human mind as relational in 
nature. The capacity of the human mind to generate the phenomenal world of sense experience, 
and also to imbue events with meaning and to initiate purposeful action, is possessed only by a 
particular whole—namely the structured arrangement of neurons found in the human brain—and 
not by those neurons taken in isolation (Hayek [1967] 2014: 284-85; Hayek 1952: 35, 46-47, 53). 
In other words, those capacities are emergent properties of the structured array of neurons found 
in the human brain and central nervous system (Butos and Koppl 2006: 40-43; McQuade 2006: 
59; Lewis 2012: 370-73). Their bearer is the higher-level or emergent entity, namely the human 
mind, that is formed when nerve fibres are arranged into the type of structure required to 
facilitate the classification of external stimuli and to respond to those stimuli in the complex, 
rule-governed way described by Hayek. On this emergent causal powers materialist account, the 
mind is viewed, not as consisting of distinctive ‘mental stuff’ that exists independently of the 
physical and biological world, but rather as an emergent property of the structured array of 
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neurons that is found in the human brain (Hayek 1952: 177-79; also see Bunge 1980: 6-9, 21-25; 
Lewis 2014). 
For Hayek, then, both the mind and the market are complex systems. In both cases, they 
consist of parts (neurons and people respectively) whose behaviour, when their interactions are 
structured by an appropriate set of rules, generates emergent properties (such as, respectively, the 
capacity to generate the sensory qualities we experience and the capacity to coordinate people’s 
plans). More generally, the picture to which this kind of emergentist position gives rise is one 
that portrays the world as reality as stratified in the sense that there is a hierarchical structure of 
ontologically distinct ‘levels’ of emergent entities, each of which has its own distinctive and 
irreducible properties. These range from the physical, the chemical, and the biological, to the 
mental (psychological), the individual, and the social. The existence of entities in the higher 
strata always depends upon their constituent lower-level component; people could not exist 
without lower-level physical and biological processes, and society would not exist in the absence 
of human action. However, at the higher levels there are emergent properties—such as the 
meaning associated with human action and the increased productivity associated with an 
elaborate division of labour—that arise only as a result of the relations that obtain between 
lower-level entities and which are qualitatively novel in the sense of being irreducible to the 
properties of those lower-level entities taken in isolation (Blitz 1992). 
Two other pieces of evidence can be adduced in support of the claim that Hayek 
subscribed to such a layered ontology. The first comes in the form of teaching notes Hayek 
produced for a seminar class on ‘Scientific Method and the Study of Society’, held at the 
University of Chicago in late 1952. The notes included a chart listing phenomena at different 
‘levels of organisation’, ranging from the gene to the cell to individuals to society, along with the 
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corresponding fields of study (genetics, physiology, etc.) (Caldwell 2004: 298-99). As used in 
the notes, the term ‘organisation’ refers here to the way in which emergent properties arise only 
when certain (lower-level) parts or elements are arranged—‘organised’— so as to form particular 
kinds of (higher-level) structure (Hayek 1952: 46-47, 1973: 27, 37; also see Lewis 2014).
8
 The 
reference to ‘levels of organisation’ can be taken, therefore, to indicate that Hayek views the 
world as consisting of a nested set of emergent entities, with lower-level entities existing within 
the context of higher-level ones in a hierarchy of levels of organisation. Hence Hayek’s remark 
that, ‘Societies differ from simpler complex structures by the fact that their elements are 
themselves complex structures’ ([1967] 2014: 288). This interpretation receives additional 
support from a second piece of evidence, namely the way in which, in some of the essays 
collected in the volume under review, Hayek describes phenomena such as the coordinative 
powers of the market as ‘higher level regularities’ or ‘higher level generalities’ ([1961] 2014: 
381-82; also see Hayek [1964] 2014: 264). The higher-level regularities are ‘wholly different … 
[from any] regularity in the behaviour of the elements’, and ‘cannot be wholly reduced to the 
regularities of the parts’ indicating once more Hayek’s commitment to the notion of emergence 
and a layered ontology ([1967] 2014: 289, 286).
9
 
We move on now to consider two important implications of Hayek’s emphasis on 
emergent properties and a layered ontology: the first concerns the nature of the interaction 
                                                     
8
 Hayek was of course aware of the fact that the ‘organized’ wholes to which he referred were not consciously designed. In this context, the term 
‘organisation’ was, of course, being used in a sense different to that intended by Hayek in his criticisms of constructive rationalism. As Hayek put 
it in the first volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty, ‘The biologist will generally speak without hesitation of “organization” without implying 
design … [B]iology has from its beginnings been concerned with that special kind of spontaneous order which we call an organism’ (1973: 27, 
37). 
9
 Given that, on Hayek’s account, both the mind and the market—and, indeed, other facets of social life, such as the law—are complex systems 
in which order arises spontaneously, the question arises of whether there is a common, underlying account of ‘system’ and of ‘spontaneous 
order’. It is noteworthy in this regard that the theoretical biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, upon whose notion of ‘system’ Hayek draws (see 
Hayek n.d. 4; Hayek [1961] 2014: 381-82), sought to develop trans-disciplinary framework—couched in terms of concepts such as 
‘organisation’, ‘level’, and ‘emergence’—that was applicable to all phenomena of organised complexity, independent of their substance or spatio-
temporal sphere of existence (Bertalanffy 1950: 164-65; Bertalanffy 1952: 11). Bertalanffy termed his framework, general system theory and it 
would seem to be one candidate for the unifying account in question. For more on Bertalanffy’s influence on Hayek’s thinking, see Lewis (2014, 
2015c). And for interesting efforts to find an abstract account of ‘spontaneous order’ common to all the particular examples considered by Hayek, 
see Bernstein (2008) and Di Zerega (2013). 
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between entities located at different levels; the second relates to the possibility of group selection 
on the basis of the emergent property that is the overall order of actions. 
 
 
5. Interaction between Levels 
One question to which this stratified account of reality gives rise concerns how entities at 
different levels interact with one another. So far as this issue is concerned, as was hinted above, 
Hayek’s theory implies that the social rules structuring people’s interaction so that they form a 
functioning market system can quite literally get inside people’s heads and shape the dispositions 
governing their actions. The process through which the internalisation of social rules happens 
centres on the way in which repeated action in conformity with a social rule can—via social-
psychological processes of habituation, imitation, and conformism—cause neurological changes 
that lead to the formation of new neural structures and, therefore, to people having new 
dispositions to conceptualise and respond to their circumstances in certain ways. 
Consider, for example, how new drivers learn the rules of the highway code. Those rules 
set out how people who drive cars on the public highway should interact with each another. 
Novice drivers have to make a conscious effort to learn the rules, so that the act of following 
them involves impulses travelling along nerve fibres in parts of the brain associated with higher-
order thought. Over time, however, as the external stimulus provided, say, by a red traffic light 
becomes associated with a particular type of action—namely, bringing the car to a halt—
connections form between the neurons stimulated by that external event and the motor fibres that 
fire when the appropriate response is taken, so that the neurons that previously had taken the 
stimulus into the higher-order nerve centres need not fire for the appropriate action to be 
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forthcoming. In the case of an experienced driver, therefore, the impulses emanating from the 
receptors stimulated by the red light simply cause the motor neurons associated with the act of 
stopping the car to fire, without the fibres associated with conscious thought coming into play. 
The upshot is that the appropriate action will be taken ‘automatically’, so that the rule will no 
longer be being followed consciously (Hayek [1967] 2014: 285-86; [1969] 2014: 317-21, 326-
27). 
In this way, the alteration in the neural structures of the brain leads to the formation of a 
new disposition—or ‘abstraction’, as Hayek also calls terms it—for the person to interpret and 
respond appropriately to an aspect of their social environment without having to make a 
conscious decision to do so on each separate occasion. As Hayek puts it:  
 
[T]he formation of abstractions ought to be regarded not as actions of the human 
mind but rather as something which happens to the mind, or that alters the structure 
of relationships which we call the mind, and which consists of the system of abstract 
rules which govern its operation. In other words we ought to regard what we call 
mind as a system of abstract rules of action (each ‘rule’ defining a class of actions) 
which determines each action by a combination of several such rules; while every 
appearance of a new rule constitutes a change in that system, something which its 
own operations cannot produce but which is brought about by extraneous forces. 
(Hayek [1969] 2014: 322) 
 
Because the neuro-physiological structure of the human brain is sensitive to people’s 
experiences, and because those experiences are shaped by the social rules that structure how 
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people interact with each other, the human mind must also be sensitive to, and causally 
influenced by, those social rules and relations. In Hayek’s words, ‘[I]ndividual reason is the 
product of inter-individual relationships’ (1952: 160). For Hayek, therefore, social rules can—
quite literally—become physically embodied in people’s brains. And by moulding people’s 
neural networks, social rules also shape the dispositions that govern how people perceive, think 
and act. In short, social rules, and the systems to which they give rise, possess the emergent 
causal power to shape human agency (Lewis 2012: 374-76).
10
 One important implication of this 
view, as we shall see, is that it will help us to mount a defence of Hayek’s much-maligned theory 
of cultural evolution, to which we now turn.  
 
 
6. Group Selection and Cultural Evolution 
One question raised by Hayek’s emergentist perspective on the market concerns the origin of the 
rules that shape people’s interactions so as to gives rise to the overall order of action (Potts: 
2013: 35-36; Lewis 2015a: section 3.3). One answer is provided by Hayek’s controversial theory 
of cultural evolution and group selection, which is most clearly outlined in this collection in his 
essay, ‘Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct’ (Hayek [1967a] 2014). While 
undoubtedly controversial and problematic, recent developments in social theory have shown 
that Hayek’s account is not perhaps as flawed as some of his critics have argued. 
Hayek’s reference to the importance of ‘the twin ideas of evolution and spontaneous 
order’ is telling in this regard ([1967] 2014: 289) (Chaumont-Chancelier 1999; Gauss 2006). For 
in Hayek’s view, it is through an evolutionary process that the set of rules required to generate 
                                                     
10
 In this regard, Hayek’s work is compatible with the ideas of various evolutionary, old institutionalist, and modern complexity economists, all 
of whom emphasise the scope for social rules to help constitute human agents and, therefore, human agency (Hodgson 2004: 184-86, 2007; Gintis 
and Bowles 2014; Gintis and Helbing 2015; Harper and Lewis 2012: 1-3; Lewis 2015b). 
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the overall order of actions comes to be established.
11
 According to Hayek’s theory, human 
societies develop through a process of competition between groups of people, where the groups 
in question are defined by reference to the sets of rules to which their members subscribe. The 
trait that forms the basis for the competition between those groups is in fact an emergent 
property, namely the ability of the sets of rules in question to generate the overall order of 
actions: ‘[W]hat may be called the natural selection of rules,’ Hayek ([1967] 2014: 279) avers, 
‘will operate on the basis of the greater or lesser efficiency of the resulting order of the group’:  
 
It is the resulting overall order of actions but not the regularity of the actions of the 
separate individuals as such which is important for the preservation of the group … 
[and] the selection process of evolution will operate on the order as a whole. ([1967] 
2014: 280, 283) 
 
Those groups whose activities were structured by a set of rules that gives rise to the relevant 
emergent property were able to generate the wealth required to sustain higher populations, while 
those groups that did not adhere to such rules declined in size and ultimately were eliminated, 
leading eventually to an outcome in which groups that exhibit the emergent power in question 
came to predominate. In Hayek’s scheme of thought, therefore, the notions of emergence, 
spontaneous order and evolution are intimately bound together, because it is in virtue of their 
                                                     
11
 The foil against which Hayek develops his evolutionary account of the emergence of the set of rules in question is provided by those 
approaches, such as contractarian political philosophy and legal positivism, that portray those rules as the deliberate creation of conscious reason. 
Hayek contends that, while the roots of this ‘constructivist rationalist’ approach are ultimately to be found in Greek philosophy, its modern 
influence begins in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the works of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and in particular René Descartes. 
Hayek traces the influence of their ideas through the works of French thinkers such as Rousseau and Comte and of English legal positivists such 
as Bentham and Austin, via Hegel and Marx, and ultimately to the market socialists and Fabian reformers of the twentieth century. From the 
current collection, see in particular the essays entitled ‘Kinds of Rationalism’ ([1965] 2014), ‘The Results of Human Action but not of Human 
Design’ ([1967] 2014), and ‘The Errors of Constructivism’ ([1970] 2014). These essays also contain Hayek’s account of the evolutionary 
tradition of thought to whose revival he saw himself as contributing, and whose leading exponents included the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
Hume, Smith, and Ferguson, the Spanish Schoolmen, the conservative political philosopher Edmund Burke, and the founder of the Austrian 
school of economics Carl Menger.  
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capacity to generate the emergent causal power to coordinate people’s actions without 
centralised direction that groups—and, more specifically, the sets of rules that characterise 
them—are selected in the process of social evolution (Gaus 2006; Lewis 2015a).12  
A noteworthy feature of Hayek’s account of cultural evolution is that the emergent 
property upon which the process of group selection acts is the outcome of the interplay between 
several different rules rather than being simply the aggregation of their separate effects. Hence 
Hayek’s remark that, ‘[S]ystems of rules of conduct will develop as wholes’ ([1967] 2014: 283):  
 
The evolutionary selection of different rules of individual conduct operates through 
the viability of the order it will produce, and any given rules of individual conduct 
may prove beneficial as part of one set of such rules, or in one set of external 
circumstances, and harmful as part of another set of rules or in another set of external 
circumstances. (Hayek [1967] 2014: 280) 
 
There is, in other words, an intricate institutional structure, whereby certain rules complement 
each other in the sense that, taken together, they give rise to capacities that are not possessed by 
any of them taken alone. For example, as Hayek makes abundantly clear, the existence of the 
emergent causal power to coordinate people’s actions requires not only formal legal rules but 
also informal moral rules of promise-keeping and truth-telling. One of those types of rules alone 
will not suffice to generate the overall order of actions (Hayek 1960: 36, 62, 158).  
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 It is also worth noting in this context that, according to Hayek, the mind develops via a process of selection through which neural structures are 
reinforced, or whither, according to how successful they are in promoting behaviour that is well adapted to the prevailing context in the sense of  
enabling a person to achieve his or her goals. Hayek’s account is one in which structured groups of neurons are selected in virtue of their 
emergent capacity to classify the world in a way that enables people successfully to navigate their environment (Hayek 1952: 74). This process of 
neuronal group selection on the basis of the emergent properties of the group of neurons is, of course, analogous to the process of group selection 
that Hayek believes accounts for the development of rule-governed social systems such as the market economy. 
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Group-selection arguments of the kind advanced by Hayek have been criticised on the 
grounds that they depend on the members of the group in question following the relevant set of 
rules, not because doing so benefits the individuals themselves, but because it is advantageous 
for the group as a whole. The problem with such self-sacrificing behaviour, the critics argue, is 
that such groups will be undermined by the growing presence amongst their membership of free-
riders who benefit from being part of the group without incurring the costs of conforming to the 
rules in question. While such groups might enjoy a ‘between group’ advantage in the process of 
competition with other collections of people, the critics contend that they will ultimately be 
undermined from within because the selfish free-riders will enjoy the benefits of group 
membership without incurring any of the costs of sustaining it. As a result, they will enjoy a 
‘within group’ advantage over the more altruistic group members who adhere to the relevant 
rules, being able to out-compete the latter and eventually coming to dominate the group 
(Vanberg 1986: 85-89). 
However, the interpretation of Hayek’s work provided above, taken together with recent 
developments in experimental economics and behavioural game theory, suggests that such 
criticisms need not be fatal for group-selection arguments of the kind advanced by Hayek. The 
evidence collected by experimental economists and behavioural game theorists suggests that 
people often possess so-called pro-social preferences. The latter encourage people both to 
cooperate even with anonymous others with whom it is known that there will be no future 
interaction and also to punish people who violate social rules even though doing so involves the 
person carrying out the punishment incurring a personal cost. Such behaviour is said to involve 
people exhibiting strong reciprocity or acting as rule-following punishers (Gintis et al. 2005; 
Henrich et al. [eds.] 2004; Gintis and Bowles 2014). 
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The punishment meted out by rule-following altruists is important because it indicates how 
group selection arguments of the kind postulated by Hayek can be defended against their critics. 
The presence within a group of even a small minority of altruistic punishers means that other 
members of the group face a realistic prospect of being penalised if they fail to follow the 
relevant social rules. The prospect of such punishment can ensure that it is in the interest even of 
those group members who are not naturally inclined to adhere to the rules in question actually to 
do so, thereby deterring free-riding and ensuring that the rules that underpin the group’s 
‘between group’ advantage are followed. On this view, altruistic punishment (also known as 
second-order cooperation, and involving people enforcing rules) can help to ensure that 
behaviour in conformity with group-benefitting rules (so-called first-order cooperation) is also 
in the individual’s own self-interest. And the realisation that a second-order disposition 
altruistically to enforce the social rules that underpin cooperative group behaviour can help to 
sustain the set of rules that defines the group and underwrites its emergent causal power to 
coordinate its members’ actions shows how group-selection arguments of the kind advanced by 
Hayek can be rescued the from their critics (Zywicki 2000; Gaus and Thrasher 2013: 645, 652-
53). 
This argument is strengthened by the possibility, noted in the previous section, that 
people’s dispositions can be shaped by the social rules governing the society in which they live. 
If we include within the category of ‘dispositions’ people’s preferences—which seems 
reasonable, because preferences dispose people to behave in certain ways—then what Hayek’s 
theoretical psychology offers is an account of the cognitive processes through which people’s 
preferences are shaped by the rules that characterise the group of which they are a member. The 
point is that repeated action in conformity with the rules that underpin the social order of actions 
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may ultimately cause people to internalise those rules, so that they acquire a pro-social 
preference or disposition for adhering to them. And if people come to value intrinsically 
behaviour that is in conformity with those rules, then they will be less likely to engage in 
opportunistic free-riding of the kind that might undermine the emergent properties that give their 
group its ‘between group’ advantage (Gaus 2006: 242).  
 
 
7. Novelty, Uncertainty and Order versus Equilibrium 
It is worth reflecting on how variety is introduced in the evolutionary process. Hayek focuses on 
two possibilities: accident; and purposeful rule-breaking. New rules may arise for ‘purely 
accidental reasons’ (Hayek 1979: 155), the accidents in question concerning the way in which 
knowledge, skills, attitudes and habits are combined (Hayek 1960: 29-33). In that case the 
variation that is introduced into the evolutionary process is random. Second, however, and more 
significantly for Hayek, new rules can arise because there are times when, in the light of their 
personal circumstances and views, an individual makes a conscious decision to ‘brave general 
opinion and to disregard a particular rule which he regards as wrong’ (1979: 171). While in his 
explicit comments on these matters, Hayek typically focuses on moral rules, the scope for 
introducing variety into social systems also encompasses the rules governing how work is 
organised and how physical and human capital are combined in the course of producing goods 
and services. Thinking about this aspect of novelty is useful because it will enable us to connect 
our discussion of the introduction of variety to our earlier accounts of the notions of emergence 
and order in Hayek’s work. 
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Evolutionary and Austrian economists such as Hodgson (1997, 2000), Dosi et al. (2003), 
Dopfer and Potts (2004, 2008), and Harper and Endres (2012) have argued that when 
entrepreneurs combine human capital, physical capital, and social rules in novel ways, they give 
rise to emergent properties. New combinations of the intra-organizational rules that govern 
production can give rise to new, emergent properties at the level of the firm, such as cheaper 
production processes and an enhanced capacity to innovate (Potts 2000). New combinations of 
capital goods generate emergent capacities absent from any of the individual components taken 
in isolation, as for instance when the correct assembly of the parts of an iPhone yields a product 
that has sui generis communicative and data-transmitting capabilities (Harper and Endres 2012). 
The idea that new combinations of capital goods can give rise to emergent properties, and 
thereby introduce novelty into the economic system, is of course central to the Hayekian account 
of capital and, in particular, the idea that there exists complementarities between different kinds 
of capital goods (Lachmann 1956; Lewin 2011; Harper and Endres 2012).  
Significantly, while these new combinations of capital and rules are composed of familiar 
elements, the emergent properties to which they give rise typically cannot be deduced from, and 
so cannot be predicted on the basis of, a prior knowledge of their individual component parts. 
The properties exhibited by such systems are novel in the sense that it is hard, if not impossible, 
to predict them from our prior knowledge of the elements. In such cases, decision-makers must 
deal with radical uncertainty; they are unable to assign sharp numerical probabilities to the 
consequences of their actions and so cannot act in the expected-utility maximizing fashion 
postulated by rational choice theory (Shackle 1972; Lachmann 1976; Arthur 2013). The answer 
to how people cope with such uncertainty is found, once again, in social rules. Perhaps most 
notably, the long-term contracts facilitated by the rules of the legal system enable people to 
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secure a degree of control over their future income and expenditure (in the case of households) 
and revenues and costs (in the case of firms). Such contracts do not tie down the future 
completely (unforeseen events may arise, which are not covered by the contract, and one or more 
parties may unexpectedly renege on their contractual commitments). But they do circumscribe 
the range of possible outcomes sufficiently for people to be able to orient themselves towards the 
future in a sensible way. In a complex world, the rules of the legal system play a similar role to 
that which Hayek attributes to scientific theories in the case of the natural world. While such 
rules ‘do[.] not tell us precisely what to expect, [they] will still make the world around us a more 
familiar world in which we can move with greater confidence that we shall not be disappointed 
because we can at least exclude certain eventualities’: 
 
It makes it a more orderly world in which … we can at least say in general terms how 
[events] hang together … Though not in a position to specify precisely what to 
expect, or even to list all possibilities … it limits the possibilities of what else may 
occur … [thereby] help[ing] us to make our action more effective. (Hayek [1955] 
2014: 209-10; also see 1976: 130).  
 
In this way, such rules enable people to act in a purposeful, goal-driven fashion.
13
   
This returns us to the conception of order to which Hayek subscribes. As noted in section 
2 above, Hayek defines ‘order’ as a situation in which a multiplicity of elements are related to 
one other in such a way that it is possible to learn from an acquaintance of part of the whole to 
form correct expectations concerning the rest. Over the course of his career, Hayek gradually 
                                                     
13
 What this suggests, of course, is that it is not only social scientists who engage in pattern prediction; the occupants of complex systems also 
have to rely on pattern prediction in attempting to devise plans that have a decent chance of being brought to a successful conclusion. For more 
on the nature of plan coordination, and on different kinds of knowledge that can sustain it (including the kinds of knowledge possible in complex 
systems), see Lewin (1997: 251-53 and 2011: chapter 3).   
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came to believe that this notion of order was more suitable than the traditional notion of 
equilibrium for conceptualising the outcomes produced by the market process, writing in 
‘Competition as a Discovery procedure’ that: ‘Economists usually ascribe the order which 
competition produces as an equilibrium—a somewhat unfortunate term, because such an 
equilibrium presupposes that the facts have already been discovered and competition has 
therefore ceased’. Hayek ultimately rejects the notion of equilibrium on the grounds that it 
cannot capture the dynamic, open-ended, evolutionary, novelty-generating features of the market 
process. The advantage possessed by the notion of order is that ‘we can meaningfully speak of an 
order being approved to various degrees, and that order can be preserved throughout a process of 
change’ ([1968] 2014: 184).14 For Hayek, therefore, the notion of order is better able to do 
justice to the nature of the market as an open-ended, evolutionary process of discovery in which, 
notwithstanding the emergence of novel goods and methods of production, people are still 
usually able to predict the behaviour of others well enough to devise plans that have a decent 
chance of coming to fruition.  
Hayek advances a transformational conception of socio-economic order (Fleetwood 
1995: 135-55; Lewis 2015a).
15
 For Hayek the continued existence of the inherited stock of social 
rules that facilitate purposeful, coordinated human agency at any given point in time depends on 
current human action (Hayek [1967] 2014: 284-89). In drawing upon the inherited rules in order 
to act, people reproduce—or, if individuals transgress and engage in new forms of conduct which 
others subsequently imitate, transform—those rules. What this suggests is that social rules may 
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 As Caldwell notes elsewhere, in a lecture delivered in 1981 Hayek was unequivocal in his dissatisfaction with the equilibrium concept as a 
means of capturing the market process. Using the metaphor of a stream to articulate his ideas about the way in which the price mechanism 
coordinates the capital stock to continuously changing economic conditions, Hayek comments as follows: ‘It is tempting to describe as an 
“equilibrium” an ideal state of affairs in which the intentions of all participants precisely match and each will find a partner willing to enter into 
the intended transaction. But because for all capitalistic production there must exist a considerable interval of time between the beginning of the 
process and its various later stages, the achievement of an equilibrium is strictly impossible. Indeed, in a literal sense, a stream can never be in 
equilibrium, because it is disequilibrium which keeps is flowing and determining its direction’ (Hayek, quoted in Caldwell 2004: 226-27). 
15
 The same is arguably also true of another Austrian economist, Ludwig Lachmann. See Lachmann (1970), Lewis and Runde (2007), Lewis 
(2011) and Lewin (2014). 
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be seen at one point in time as relatively stable points while at others as features of the economic 
systems that are subject to change. Commercial law is necessary for the conduct of economic life 
and indeed facilitates the emerge of unpredictable novelty in economic life, but economic and 
technological changes of certain types put a strain on aspects of the law that prompt it to change. 
For example, the emergence of electronic communications has suggested the acceptance of 
facsimile signatures and has raised difficult legal questions relating to copyright and privacy on 
the internet. However, so long as the extant set of rules continues to generate the emergent causal 
power to coordinate people’s plans, an outcome that is orderly in the sense defined above will 
still be generated. On this view, social order just is the (continual, never-ending) process 
whereby people draw on (pre-existing, historically given) social rules and norms in order to act 
and, in doing so, subsequently either reproduce or transform the rules in question.  
 
 
8. The Nature of the Tendency towards Plan Coordination 
It was argued above that, for Hayek, the capacity of the market to coordinate people’s plans is an 
emergent property of the set of rules that characterises the liberal market system. Put slightly 
differently, those rules constitute a generative mechanism that, when set in motion by the 
behaviour of the people whose (inter)actions they shape and structure, gives rise to the emergent 
causal power to coordinate people’s plans even in the absence of centralised direction. The fact 
that the mechanism underpinning the overall order of action is animated only by human agency 
is significant because it implies that outcomes in the market are the product of the interplay 
between two ontologically distinct and relatively autonomous causal powers, namely the overall 
order of actions and the power of people in engage in purposeful, creative decision-making. It is 
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for this reason, of course, that Hayek describes the working of the market system as involving 
the interplay of causal powers—or ‘regularities’, as Hayek terms them—‘on ... two levels’ and 
involving the ‘interaction between the regularity of the conduct of the elements [people] and the 
regularity of the resulting structure’ ([1967] 2014: 286, 288-89; also see Hayek 1979: 158). 
On this view, the actual outcome produced by the market is the result of the interplay 
between two ontologically distinct, and relatively autonomous, levels, ‘the individual and the 
social’, each of which possesses its own distinct (emergent) causal powers. But then there arises 
the possibility that the capacity of the market to bring people’s plans into conformity with one 
another might be offset by the capacity of human agents to respond so autonomously, so 
creatively—and, therefore, so unexpectedly—to their circumstances that they surprise one 
another and as a result develop plans that are less, not more, compatible. The creative powers of 
human agents may be such that, to use the terminology employed by subsequent generations of 
Austrian economists, dis-coordinating forces are generated endogenously, as part of the market 
process. Moreover, the tendency to endogenous dis-coordination produced by creative human 
agency may even outweigh the capacity of the liberal market economy to bring plans into greater 
conformity with each other, so that the operation of the market process leads to less, not more, 
plan coordination (Lachmann 1976: 129; Rizzo 1996: xvii-xxi; cf. Beinhocker 2006: 109-14; 
Arthur 2013).
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Ultimately, therefore, as Hayek himself clearly recognized, even in the absence of 
external disturbances the question of whether the market system tends to produce greater plan 
coordination cannot be answered on the basis of a priori argument alone. As Hayek remarked in 
1983, ‘while the analysis of individual planning is in a way an a priori system of logic, the 
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 On this view, the emergent causal power of the market to coordinate people’s actions is best viewed as giving rise to a non-empirical or 
transfactual tendency towards the dovetailing of people’s plans, whose impact on the outcomes that actually arise may be offset by the impact of 
other, countervailing tendencies, most notably those produced by creative human agency (Lewis 2011).  
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empirical element enters in people learning about what other people do … [Y]ou can’t claim, as 
Mises does, that the whole theory of the market is an a priori system, because of the empirical 
factor which comes in that one person learns about what another person does’ (Hayek, quoted in 
Caldwell 2004: 221; also see Hayek [1937] 2014: 68-70). Of course, the evidence indicates ex 
posteriori that the coordinative powers tend to prevail. However, as Hayek himself clearly 
recognised, there are no guarantees that they will always and invariably do so. 
 
 
9. Conclusion: Hayek and Complexity Theory 
We end by considering the extent to which Hayek’s ideas anticipate the work of modern 
complexity theorists (Vaughn 1999b; Vriend 2002; Rosser 2010). While there are many different 
definitions of complexity, none of which command universal ascent (Horgan 1997), complex 
systems are commonly said to possess the following attributes. 
 
 First, they are composed of a set of elements which are related to one another in a 
particular way, forming a structure that governs how they interact and that displays 
emergent properties (Holland 1998: 2-6, 14, 225; Miller and Page 2007: 9-10, 48-50; 
Page 2011: 25-26).   
 Second, they are hierarchical, in the sense that systems obtaining at one level of 
organisation (the physical, say, or the individual) form the building blocks (sub-systems) 
out of which systems obtaining at higher levels (the chemical or the social respectively) 
are composed (Holland 1988: 6-9; Miller and Page 2007: 40-42, 50-51).  
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 Third, the emergent properties that obtain at each level of the system are the product of a 
process of self-organisation, arising as a result of the rule-guided responses of the 
individual elements to their local environment (rather than from directions issued by a 
central controller possessing an over-arching, synoptic view of the entire situation) 
(Holland 1998: 141-42; Beinhocker 2006: 167-68). 
 Fourth, these properties are often novel in the sense that it is hard, if not impossible, to 
predict them from our prior knowledge of the elements. On this view, novelty is 
generated endogenously, via the operation of the system itself, as well as through 
exogenous shocks (Holland 1998: 4, 229-30; Beinhocker 2006: 97; Arthur 2013). 
 Fifth, the systems obtaining at each level are adaptive in the sense that they adjust to the 
broader environment in which they are situated via an evolutionary process involving 
variation, selection, and (differential rates of) reproduction (Beinhocker 2006: 18-19; 
Page 2011: 25).  
 Sixth, the outcomes produced by such systems do not lend themselves to being 
understood using standard notions of (economic) equilibrium, but rather in terms of 
alternative notions of ‘order’ (Beinhocker 2006: 17-19, 76-75; Miller and Page 2007: 
222; Page 2011: 27; Arthur 2013).  
 
Hayek’s explicit definition of complexity tends—as we have seen—to focus on the number of 
variables required to represent a system and on the presence of emergent properties (section 3 
above). However, Hayek’s writings, as showcased in the volume under review here, also refer to 
most if not all of the other aspects of complexity listed above, so that his own use of what would 
now be regarded as complexity-related ideas often outstrips his explicit definitions of complex 
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systems. For, as we have seen, Hayek attributes to mind, and to society, many of the other 
features commonly said to be hallmarks of complex systems: in each case, order arises 
spontaneously, as a result of rule-governed interactions between the system’s parts rather than 
through conscious control (see sections 2 and 4 above); both systems are adaptive, evolving so as 
to become better fitted to their environment via a process of group selection (section 6); the two 
systems form part of a larger hierarchy of structures (sections 4 and 5); while the patterns 
produced in such systems are best conceptualised, not in terms of ‘equilibrium’, but of ‘order’ 
(section 7). 
It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which Hayek anticipated modern 
complexity theory. His understanding of some of the concepts listed above was of course 
different in certain key respects from that of modern complexity theorists. For instance, it is hard 
to argue convincingly that in his notion of ‘order’ Hayek had an (implicit) understanding of 
technical concepts in modern complexity theory such as ‘basins of attraction’ and ‘strange 
attractors’. Moreover, there are also important respects in which Hayek’s account of complex 
systems diverges notably from modern complexity theory. For instance, Hayek’s account of the 
economy as a complex system tends to emphasise negative rather than positive feedback (Hayek 
[1968] 2014: 309), whereas contemporary complexity theory sets great store by increasing 
returns to scale and positive feedback (Miller and Page 2007: 50-52; Witt 2013: 123; Arthur 
2013). Also, Hayek’s ideas about complexity tend to be presented discursively, in marked 
contrast to the modern’s approach’s emphasis on mathematical and computer modelling. 
However, it seems safe to conclude, following Rosser (1999: 185-86), Caldwell (2004: 363) and 
Gaus (2006: 254 n. 5), that, while Hayek never developed what contemporary complexity 
theorists would regard as a fully-fledged theory of complexity (in the sense of articulating a 
35 
 
completely integrated, formal account of all the features listed above), his writings display many 
of the ideas that were later crystallised into complexity theory.
17
  
What is clear enough, though, as this essay has hopefully demonstrated, is ‘the gradual 
emergence of and, indeed, the underlying order to be discovered in Hayek’s ideas’ (2014: 1). As 
editor Bruce Caldwell (2014: 35) writes: ‘The title of this volume is The Market and Other 
Orders. The title is meant to highlight Hayek’s own path: he began with the market order, then 
became aware of the existence of orders in many other areas.’ Caldwell has succeeded admirably 
in his aim of bringing out the unity in Hayek’s thinking across a wide range of time a set of 
topics that might appear at first glance to be rather disparate. Scholars have reason to be grateful 
for the care and good judgment with which he has curated this volume. 
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